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Abstract
This article analyzes microcredit as an arena of negotiations and tradeoffs, by
drawing on a case study from Limpopo, South Africa. Special attention is focused
on how the distribution of rights and responsibilities between the microcredit
organization and the  microcredit groups, together with the multifaceted struggles
over authority and power, mediate the different actors’ social agency and
opportunities to benefit from the microcredit programmes. The results of this
study illustrate how social relations between the members of the microcredit
groups are based on ambiguous forms of cooperation and conflict around diverse
interests and multifaceted power relations. While social networks are crucial for
the establishment and maintenance of business operations, the structural
conditions of poverty and marginalization place the women in competition with
each other over limited resources and easily saturated markets.
Key words: authority and power, cooperation and conflict, microcredit, social
networks, South Africa
Deleted: social
Deleted: at the same time
4
Introduction
Under the most popular tree of a village in Limpopo Province, a group of women
are gathered together, trying to find shelter from the blistering heat of the sun.
Every  two  weeks,  month  after  month,  a  microcredit  repayment  meeting  –  or  a
’centre meeting’, as they call it – starts with a hymn, sometimes with a prayer,
and the vows of collective repayment.
In principle, this day does not differ from many others, except that this time there
is a visitor from a faraway country attending the meeting. The specialness of the
situation seems to energize not only me but all the participants, from the clients to
the ‘development facilitator’. As always, each group leader is asked to deliver the
repayments and the ledgers to the meeting committee that takes care of the
bookkeeping. If someone does not pay, the other group members are expected to
contribute. This hapless group is then grilled by the development facilitator and
the committee about the reasons of the delinquent conduct.
All of a sudden, a group of women start dancing and singing. It is only
afterwards, after hours of chatting with some of the women that I realize the
reason. One of the clients was absent and the other group members did not have
money to pay on her behalf. The dancing was intended to create an atmosphere of
diversion while the members of this particular group were ordered by the
development facilitator to go and get the money, one way or another, before I
realized what the situation was. And it was only afterwards that one of the group
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leaders revealed to me how she took advantage of the situation: by deceiving the
development facilitator and, when no-one was looking, paying on the other group
member’s behalf. ‘This was just to keep the group’s books clean’, she said to me
when explaining her strategy for bending the rules.
The records thus ended up correct on this sunny day. The money was locked in a
strongbox, and the chairperson took a taxi to deposit the carefully protected notes
into a bank account in the town. The development facilitator again reminded the
women of the importance of saving before she rushed to the next meeting in
another village. This scene, with or without any tricks, is repeated in dozens of
villages every day all around Limpopo by those engaged in microcredit
programmes.1
Microcredit, as an extension of small loans to poor or low-income clients with
limited access to formal credit markets, has become one of the most popular
development strategies in various parts of the global South in recent years. The
pioneer and the most well-known microlender, with its 7.6 million current clients,
is the Grameen Bank, which originated in Bangladesh in 1976 (Grameen Bank
2008a). Since then, the Grameen Bank lending model has been adopted by
hundreds of microcredit institutions all over the world, including the Small
Enterprise Foundation (SEF), operating in South Africa. In this model, credit is
1 This narrative is based on the first author’s field diary notes on her experience of fieldwork in
South Africa in 2007. Hietalahti carried out the fieldwork for this research in South Africa.
Nygren participated in the conceptualization of the theoretical framework and on the data
analysis. The writing of this article was carried out as a joint exercise among the authors.
6
provided for a group of five, mainly female members, who then invest the money
in small businesses and assume joint liability for the loan repayment. Typically,
no collateral is required. The idea is that ‘community-based’ women groups share
responsibility and follow the rules and ethics of participatory interaction
(Grameen Bank 2008b). If serious repayment problems emerge, all the group
members will be cut off from subsequent loans. If everything goes well, the group
is likely to be granted a larger loan in the next loan cycle.
The underlying vision behind this model is that the provision of small loans and
other financial services for the poor facilitates economic development and
livelihood improvement in rural communities and peri-urban settlements with
high rates of unemployment, lack of working capital, and problems of chronic
poverty. Providing small amounts of credit for impoverished women to initiate
business ventures is considered as a means for them to generate income for the
basic needs of living, cope with adverse shocks, learn to manage cash flows, and
save money for further investments. Moreover, microcredit is seen as an efficient
tool for empowering poor women by increasing self-esteem and decision-making
capability, and encouraging new business initiatives (CGAP 2008).
The group lending model is based on the idea of social capital as a ‘valuable
asset’, which the poor can always turn to even when economic assets are scarce
(González de la Rocha 2007). Robert Putnam’s (1993, 2000) ideas, especially,
have gained increasing popularity in mainstream development thinking in recent




enhance cooperative goals and reduce the costs of economic transactions. This
belief in the capacity of trust relations, solidarity networks, and associational life
to fuel economic and social development under conditions of poverty has inspired
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other development
agencies to allocate an increasing amount of resources from traditional poverty
reduction strategies to microcredit programmes (Molyneux 2002). The United
Nations declared the year 2005 as an ‘International Year of Microcredit’. The
following year, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Mr. Muhammad Yunus and
the Grameen Bank for their ‘efforts to create economic and social development
from below’ (Nobel Peace Prize 2006). This event became a breakthrough for the
microcredit industry. According to the MicroCredit Summit Campaign, more than
3,300 microcredit institutions served 133 million clients worldwide by the end of
2006, about 93 million of whom had been living on less than one dollar a day
before they were enrolled in microcredit programmes (Daley-Harris 2007: 4).
This success story of the Grameen Bank and the associated group lending model
has promoted a lively discussion about the achievements and constraints of the
microcredit programmes. The capability of the group lending model to guarantee
high repayment rates and to reach the poorest of the poor has inspired several
economists to analyze the incentives used in the group lending model and the
mechanisms of client selection, peer monitoring, and peer-sanctions included in
the microcredit programmes (Anderson et al. 2002, Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch 2005, Hermes et al. 2005, Morduch 1999, Mosley 2001, Stieglitz 1990).
According to these researchers, microcredit programmes use dynamic incentives,
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regular repayment schedules, and social ties of solidarity as collateral substitutes
to mitigate the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and free-riding. In this
way, the programmes guarantee exceptionally high repayment rates, and have
become an effective solution to poverty.
At the same time, a growing number of social scientists have challenged the
romantic notions that ‘solidarity’ and ‘participatory emancipation’ are
extraordinary tools for sustainable development (Bähre 2007a, Molyneux 2002,
Rankin 2002). According to these researchers, the development policies
promoting microcredit programmes as ‘magic bullets’ for economic and social
well-being are based on simplistic assumptions about harmonic kinship and
neighbourhood relations in southern communities (Rankin 2002), about the
gendered role of women as money savers (Molyneux 2002), about the ability of
horizontal norms and networks to generate trust and solidarity (Guérin 2006), and
about local communities as pristine sources of social capital (Bähre 2007b).
Going back to that sunny day in Limpopo and examining the women’s behaviour,
it becomes clear fairly soon that considering microcredit simply as an
organization that provides financial services to the poor constitutes a relatively
narrow view of the scene. The numbers at the microcredit organization’s financial
balance sheet books reveal only a fragment of the actual engagements,
contestations and concerns prevalent in the repayment meetings, market places,
and everyday interactions among the members of the microcredit groups, and
between the microcredit groups and the microcredit organization.
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In this essay, we conceptualize microcredit as an arena in which various types of
actors, with their differing interests, logic of decision-making and political power
relations, interact with and confront each other (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 137–
138). By drawing on an ethnographic case study from Limpopo, South Africa, we
analyze the rules and responsibilities involved in the microcredit programmes,
both from the point of view of the microcredit organization and the women as
target groups. Through an analysis of how the clients are selected, how the groups
are formed, how the businesses are monitored, and how the different rights and
responsibilities are distributed, we aim to build a picture of microcredit as an
economic and socio-political institution. At the same time, we illustrate how
economic affairs are tightly interwoven with social rules, cultural norms and
political power relations in the business of microcredits and liabilities, where the
multiple struggles over resources and authority shape the ways how different
stakeholders meet each other.
Theoretical framework
Alleviating poverty through providing small-scale banking and credit services for
the poor is not an entirely new idea. The emergence of microcredit programmes
goes back to the 1950s, and since the early 1970s, social movements aiming to
enhance women’s access to credit have appeared in different parts of the world
(Mayoux 2001). South Africa has a long history of using financial self-help
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and credit associations, as well as burial and funeral societies (Bähre 2007a).
Nevertheless, the adaptation of group lending models for microcredit
programmes, and the rise of these programmes to become leading strategies of
poverty alleviation within mainstream development institutions is a relatively
recent phenomenon. This trend has close links to neoliberal economic policies and
the idea of market-based mechanisms as efficient means of poverty mitigation
(Kay 2006, Rankin 2002). Amid the economic restructuring included in
globalization, social networks have been given a larger role in the promotion of
economic development in the global South. Within this framework, microcredit
programmes and the associated group-based models are represented as crucial
landmarks for revised approaches to poverty alleviation in which the focus is
shifted from state-subsidized, small-farmer credits for men to financially self-
sustainable microcredit institutions that target the female poor as entrepreneurial
actors and as agents of their own development (Meagher 2005, Molynex 2002).
This scene, supported by strong expectations of women’s empowerment, is based
primarily on Robert Putnam’s (1993, 2000) conceptions of social capital.
According to Putnam (1995: 65), social capital refers to ‘features of social
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination
and cooperation for mutual benefit’. The trustworthiness involved in close social
networks and horizontal associations creates, according to Putnam, bonds of
social cohesion and mutual fairness that reduce transaction costs and encourage
economic productivity. As noted by Schuller et al. (2001: 13), the revalorization
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of social networks and civic engagement in development advocacy and business
circles – after a period of strong dismissal of them in the face of globalized market
relationships – is in itself a welcome contribution. It is a reminder of the crucial
role of social and political relationships in economic decision-making, thereby
pointing out the tight articulations between economy and society (McNeill 2004).
Instead of considering the Southern poor as powerless victims of globalization,
social capital -oriented literature emphasizes that they are subjects who construct
their livelihoods and life-worlds through their remarkable capability for social
networking, which allows them to cope with economic crises and might even
provide them a way out of poverty.
Putnam’s argumentations on trustworthiness and shared objectives involved in
close social networks, and the operationalization of these arguments in
mainstream development discourses, have, however, also been met with criticism.
Considerable criticism has been raised especially toward the ways in which social
capital has been taken as an inherent value and an unproblematic means to
reintroduce a ‘human face’ into global capitalism (Schuller et al. 2001: 13–14).
According to the critics, the arguments in social capital -oriented literature of how
helpful poor people are to each other even when faced with depressing living
conditions are based on romanticized views of the ability of close social ties to
generate trust and solidarity (Beall 2001, Bähre 2007b). At the same time,
important questions relevant for microcredit programmes as poverty alleviation
strategies are easily overlooked; these include ambivalent community relations
and feelings of solidarity, socially and culturally embedded decision-making
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strategies, multifaceted power relations, and the often limited ability of the poor to
negotiate social relationships to their advantage (Guérin 2006, Meagher 2006).
According to the critics, by failing to address issues of power and social
inequality, the concept of social capital hides more than it reveals (Bebbington
2004, Fine 2002, Wilshusen 2009b).
Based on these limitations and drawing on works of Pierre Bourdieu, a number of
political anthropologists and political geographers have recently focused on social
capital as networks of everyday politics (Bebbington 2007, Cleaver 2005,
Wilshusen 2009b). According to these researchers, Bourdieu’s ideas of how
analyses of everyday interactions, in linkage with broader institutional and
political settings, can reveal important aspects of the underlying struggles over
authority and meaning, offer new opportunities to incorporate social capital as an
analytical category in development research. For Bourdieu (1977, 1986), the term
social capital represents both embodied forms of social networks and the power
resources involved in such networks. In contrast to analyses that focus only on the
formal arenas of social interaction and rational understanding of human agency,
Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of often-overlooked negotiations occurring
in informal and invisible arenas of political engagement. Within this framework,
social capital is understood as both a product and producer of cultural and
political economy, where social networks, while enabling access to particular
resources for certain actors, at the same time constrain the access to these
resources from others. Therefore, the role of social networks in poverty alleviation
can only be understood if analyzed in terms of the distribution of resources and
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power relationships (Bebbington 2007: 156–157).
By conceptualizing microcredit as an arena in which various types of actors,
driven by more or less compatible goals and endowed with different degrees of
decision-making power, cooperate and confront each other, we aim to reveal the
complexity of social relationships and rules interwoven in microcredit
programmes. The conditions under which credits are granted, accessed and
controlled have a considerable impact on the distribution of benefits and
constraints within the microcredit programmes (Meagher 2006).
Drawing on our case study from Limpopo, we point out the need to pay careful
attention to local politics and institutional processes when evaluating the
achievements of and challenges for microcredit programmes. As will be shown in
the following analysis, the social ties between the women engaged in microcredit
programmes are mediated by complex webs of solidarity and conflict within the
ambivalent politics of everyday life (Wilshusen 2009a). Concerns over the
liabilities and challenges to meet the requirements of the loan repayments affect
the ways in which the microcredit group members trust each other, how solidarity
is shaped, how money is allocated, and how the businesses are operated. Strict
rules and responsibilities regarding the microcredit organization, combined with
different stakeholders’ multifaceted interests, further complicate the situation.
Even if the notion of social capital has its uses herein, assumptions that the clients
automatically support each other and strive for collectively-shared goals tend to
glorify social cohesion and trustworthiness, while at the same time
Deleted: South Africa,
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underestimating the existing tensions and asymmetries (Cleaver 2005, Molyneux
2002). Through an analysis of how access to resources and social networks is
mediated by power-laden distinctions, and how certain forms of social capital
serve to reproduce these distinctions (Bourdieu 1977), we aim to illustrate the
complex forms of negotiation and contestation involved in the interactions
between women in microcredit groups, as well as between microcredit groups as
loan receivers and a microcredit organization as a loan provider.
By analyzing the everyday politics involved in microcredit as a socio-political
institution, we also recognize that many of the power relations and socio-political
processes shaping the conditions of microcredit programmes extend far beyond
the local boundaries. On this basis, we examine the opportunities of the women in
Limpopo to negotiate the terms of their involvement in the microcredit
programmes, through practices that are structured although not completely
determined by the wider institutional and political-economic settings. By
exploring the aspirations, concerns, and strategies used by different actors
involved in the negotiations and trade-offs over microcredits, we provide an
analysis of microcredit as an arena where different stakeholders have varying
degrees of power to decide how and by whom the resources are used, and who is
taking control over strategic decisions. At the same time, we also aim to illustrate
how economic and social spheres become intrinsically interwoven in the politics
of microcredit, in which financial strategies are tightly enmeshed with socio-
political power relations, while socio-political power relations are strongly




The fieldwork for this research was carried out in Limpopo between May and July
2007. The study area covers two rural and two semi-urban settlements, located on
the eastern side of the province, all of them within a few hours’ drive from the
town of Tzaneen, where the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) has its head
office.
Limpopo is one of the poorest and least urbanized provinces in South Africa.
People who identify themselves as Africans comprise 97 per cent of the
province’s 5.3 million population. Great inequality in the distribution of income
and wealth characterize the living conditions in Limpopo, combined with high
rates of poverty and poor infrastructure. Only 27 per cent of the Black African
population in Limpopo was employed in 2004 and 34 per cent of those employed
were working in the informal sector. About 33 per cent of the population had no
access to schooling, 27 per cent were using candles for lighting, and only 30 per
cent had piped water in their yard. Industrial activities in Limpopo are limited to
small mining operations that contribute few percentages to the South African
GDB (Lehohla 2006: 1−3, 9, 27−28, 59, 75−76, 85). In 2003, health spending in
Limpopo was R637 (68 EUR) per capita, which is almost 30 per cent below the
national average. HIV-related tuberculosis and lower respiratory tract infections
are among the leading causes of death (Thorn 2004). In 2002, 16 per cent of the
women who attended antenatal clinics in Limpopo were infected with HIV
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(Lehohla 2006: 45).
The Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) has operated in Limpopo since 1992,
providing group-based microcredits and other financial services for the poor
population. According to SEF’s mission statement, the organization works for ‘the
elimination of poverty and unemployment in a sustainable manner by providing
credit for self-employment, combined with savings mobilization and a
methodology that substantially increases the poor’s chances of successful self-
employment’ (SEF 2009). At the end of 2007, SEF’s principal outstanding was
R58.6 million (5 million EUR) and the organization’s 255 staff members were
serving approximately 45,740 self-employed clients in different parts of Limpopo
(SEF 2009). Recently, SEF has expanded its business operations to two other
provinces: Mpumalanga Province, east of Johannesburg and the Eastern Cape
Province on the coast.
SEF has two credit programmes targeted at the poor. The original Micro Credit
Programme (MCP), which provides credits for the poor who already operate a
micro-enterprise, and the Tšhomisano Credit Programme (TCP)2,  which  is  a
special programme for poverty alleviation that started in 1996, and that currently
makes up 68 per cent of SEF’s clients. The TCP clients are the poorest of the poor
according to the SEF’s own evaluation, based on the Participatory Wealth
Ranking system, where the income level of R920 (80 EUR) per month is used as a
poverty line for a household with five members (SEF 2008: 3). In MCP, the
2 Tšhomisano means ‘working together’ in northern Sotho.
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clients need to have at least six months’ business experience prior to the loan
being granted, while in TCP, no previous business experience is required.
Currently, 99 per cent of all the SEF clients are female (SEF 2008: 3). Typical
business operations in which they are involved include fruit and vegetable
hawking, selling new and used clothes, running of small grocery shops, or
dressmaking and other kinds of sewing jobs. Loans provided by SEF range from
R500 (40 EUR) to R10,000 (870 EUR). Operationally, SEF aims to combine the
objectives of poverty mitigation and financial self-sustainability. In 2008, SEF’s
financial self-sufficiency was estimated to be 95 per cent (SEF 2008: 1, 6).
Intensive policies of structural adjustment implemented in South Africa since the
1980s, combined with agro-industrial restructuring and globalization of
agricultural commodity markets, have altered the living conditions of
smallholders and rural workers in Limpopo, as elsewhere in South Africa in
recent years (Toit 2004). Governmental expenditures on social welfare and
subsidies for small-scale agriculture have been reduced, and economic insecurity
pressures the poor to engage in a variety of economic activities, income sources,
and intermittent jobs because the returns from any single activity are too low and
unpredictable to guarantee livelihood security (Francis 2002). Women’s
participation in informal labour and product markets has increased in recent years,
although the businesses and jobs in which they are engaged are precarious in
many ways.
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During the fieldwork for this study, thematic interviews were carried out with 50
SEF  clients  in  Limpopo,  consisting  of  16  participants  in  a  TCP  in  a  rural
settlement and 34 participants in a MCP in rural and semi-urban localities. The
locations were selected on the basis of their microcredit history, level of
urbanization, population composition, and livelihood profiles. The clients were
first met in the repayment meetings and then asked if they were willing to
participate in the interviews. The interviewees belonged to different credit groups
and various socio-economic positions; they represented different types of
households and were involved in a variety of business ventures.
The main topics in the interviews were the clients’ economic activities, credits
obtained from SEF, financial strategies, and participation in different kinds of
microcredit programmes and informal organizations. Other important topics
included business and selling strategies, such as price formation, marketing,
stocking, and investing. Considerable attention was also paid to people’s decision-
making logic and forms of networking, including the social rules and practices
related to client selection, microcredit group formation, monitoring, knowledge-
sharing, and trust-building. The questions were designed to encourage
respondents to tell about their activities and business experiences in their own
words, and through their own way of thinking, thereby aiming to capture the
dynamic interplay of economic activities, social relations and cultural practices
within the people’s livelihood strategizing. Two interpreters, both of whom were
Shangaan by origin, helped translate all the questions into and from the local
languages − Sepedi, Sesotho and Shangaan.
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Identifying the women’s business operations and estimating the earnings gained
from them proved to be a complicated task. Market activities and earnings varied
from day to day, and some of the activities were so sporadic that their significance
was easily underestimated. Many of the women did not calculate profits or
savings in strict monetary terms but rather estimated them in loose descriptive
phrases, such as ‘I earn something’ or ‘My income is little’, nor did all the women
differentiate between profits and revenues. Some of the women were also
reluctant to give details about their sales and earnings, partly because of the
overall economic and political volatility, partly because of the fear of sanctions
included in the microcredit programmes and the associated rules of group
monitoring. By exploring the social relations and institutional arrangements
interwoven in the clients’ business operations, we aimed to understand the
decision-making mechanisms and the opportunities and constraints faced by
people when gauging their possibilities of managing microcredits and operating a
micro-enterprise. The diverse forms of creativity, social cooperation and ‘hidden’
economic capabilities possessed by the clients were carefully considered, together
with the social tensions, cultural norms and political power relations that mediated
their opportunities to benefit from different business ventures.
To understand the logic of the microcredit business from the point of view of
credit providers, fifteen SEF staff members from management to fieldworker level
were also interviewed. The main topics in these interviews were SEF’s aims and
strategies, organizational structures, and the main achievements of and challenges
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for microcredit as a strategy for poverty alleviation. Other key questions included
the objectives and practices of SEF’s incentive mechanisms, the rules and
responsibilities included in the microcredit programmes, and the means to manage
conflict situations. The staff members were also asked about their experiences
concerning the clients’ business strategies and skills, credit needs and logic of
decision-making, as well as the role of social networks and cultural rules.
Besides the interviews, a content analysis of the reports and available reviews of
SEF operations was carried out. These documents provided valuable information
on the mechanisms to control operational costs, incentives to motivate staff
members, means to ensure high loan repayment rates, and strategies to achieve
financial and organizational sustainability. All the interviews with both the clients
and the SEF staff members were recorded with the approval of each participant.
After the fieldwork, the interviews were transcribed and entered into a database
for further analysis. In order to protect people’s privacy and to avoid hampering
their lives, all the names of the informants have been changed to pseudonyms.
The information provided in the interviews and documents was complemented
and cross-checked by participant observation and informal conversations when
visiting the women’s homes, or meeting them at the workshops or in
marketplaces. The same hold true when visiting the SEF’s branch offices and
attending the repayment meetings. Participant observation as a process of learning
through involvement in the daily activities of people and systematic recording of
these observations, can provide access to information that would otherwise be
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difficult to obtain, such as the social positions people occupy, people’s
relationships with one another, and the discrepancies between what people say
they are doing and their actual behaviour (Nygren 2004: 192–193). In this study,
participant observation and informal conversations offered valuable information
about the women’s business opportunities and constraints, as well as the social
rules and political power relations involved. As participant observation depends
on the researcher as the primary tool of data-collection, critical self-reflection is
crucial for the recognition of any potential bias. As females, we might have been
able to capture some special features of the studied women’s gendered trajectories
of life and business strategies. At the same time, as a foreigner, who was easily
linked to ‘SEF management’ by the clients or to a ‘Northern academic’ by the
SEF staff members, it was a challenge to carry out field research in Limpopo and
to interpret the gathered data in a contextually sensitive way.
Considering microcredit as a socio-political institution, the opportunity to attend
several loan repayment meetings was crucial in order to successfully conduct this
research. These meetings offered important opportunities to observe how different
actors cooperated, contested and confronted each other. Social networks and
political power relations are difficult to study through interviews that tend to
present idealistic views. Thus, participant observation in the meetings and in
everyday social interaction was significant for understanding the different actors’
multifaceted identities and roles, and the related social norms and positions of
power. These arenas provided a fruitful scene for an array of strategies, from
negotiations to manipulations, present in social interactions of different actors,
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together with multifaceted personal and professional ambitions and struggles over
authority. In these situations, especially, at least some of the discrepancies
between the description of the situation that different stakeholders gave the
foreign researcher and the everyday reality of the actual events and experiences
were interestingly revealed.
Microcredit as an arena of ambiguous rules and responsibilities
In the microcredit business in Limpopo, complicated rules and regulations shape
the ways that different stakeholders cooperate, contest and confront each other.
Without careful consideration of the mechanisms that mediate the norms and
responsibilities between the microcredit organization and the clients, as well as
between the clients themselves, it is difficult to understand microcredit as a socio-
political institution that regulates the business affairs of the poor.
According to the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), their mission as a
microcredit provider was to ‘work aggressively towards the elimination of
poverty’ with the aim of a ‘world free of poverty’ (SEF 2008: 2). By stressing the
poor’s own responsibility to find pathways out of poverty, SEF emphasized the
role of clients as committed agents in fostering feasible forms of income
generation and social empowerment. What was left to SEF was to create an
enabling environment by ensuring that each client gets an appropriate loan:
neither too big to handle, nor too small to prevent the flourishing of the business.
Roger, one of the staff members at SEF management conceptualized the matter as
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follows:
What SEF is for is to support people so that they can change their own
lives. So to give them an appropriate sum of money and hopefully to
create the group environment...So that they can create a business, grow in
business, and be successful.
(Roger, SEF staff member, 13 July 2007)
In the eyes of SEF clients, microcredits offered a chance for a better standard of
living: People decided to join SEF’s programmes when they heard success stories
about clients who had managed to build a new house or to pay their children’s
school fees with the help of a microcredit. What made SEF especially valuable in
the eyes of its clients was the fact that SEF provided credit without a need for
collateral.  For  many  poor  African  women,  SEF  was  their  first  encounter  with  a
formal system of loans and savings; previously they had been strongly dependent
on loan sharks, called ‘Mashonisas’. In this context, it was not surprising that
many of the clients considered SEF as ‘a bit like a bank that helps the poor’.
Especially appreciated were the SEF’s repayment plans: loans from R500 to
R10,000 to be paid back within 4-10 months, with an interest rate of 16 per cent to
40 per cent (SEF 2002). Loan sharks, in turn, gave a few hundred Rands for a
month, with 50 per cent actual interest. The Mashonisas asked for identity
documents and bank cards as collateral: at the end of the month they withdrew the
money from the client’s bank account or if there was not sufficient coverage, they
came to the debtor’s home and confiscated furniture or other items of sufficient
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value. Many of the clients had difficulties in paying the debts from loan sharks in
time; thus there were few other choices but to take a new loan. As the interest of
the loan was compounded every month, the sum of the debts easily accumulated
to amounts difficult to repay.
In the SEF lending model, the loans were granted to a group of five members on a
joint liability basis. The clients were asked to establish groups with persons whom
they trusted and whom they would be willing to help in case of need. Before
getting the loans, the groups had to go through a training course and a group
recognition process. As soon as the training section was completed, the applicants
met a development facilitator who assisted them in formulating a reasonable loan
plan. After the plan was accepted by the SEF’s Branch Manager, the groups were
confirmed, and the loan approvals registered.
A minimum of two microcredit groups formed a ‘centre’, which was responsible
for arranging the repayment and savings meetings called ‘centre meetings’, the
idea being that through meetings people would learn to make informed decisions
and feel socially committed to obey the rules. Each centre had to meet every two
weeks and no absences were allowed without an apology and a good reason. If a
group member was absent from the meeting and did not pay, the other members
either went to her to ask for an explanation, or they paid on her behalf and then
pressured her to pay afterwards. Development facilitators controlled the
successful completion of the programme by applying strict rules. Repayments
were enforced by detailed monitoring and sometimes by refusing to let anyone
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leave the centre meeting until all the money was paid.
According to SEF management, such rules had been designated to ensure high
repayment rates and to prevent arrears. At the same time, these rules created a
strong link between the clients. While the clients’ expectations of the microcredit
groups were reflected in the designation of the group names, such as ‘Gathering’,
‘Grace’, or ‘Love Each Other’, sometimes these expectations remained only
romantic fantasies. The everyday politics of microcredit included complicated
struggles over ambiguous interests and diverse positions of power. Ironically,
there were also groups called ‘Battle’ or ‘Sorrow’.
While the SEF’s lending model enabled loans for poor women without financial
collateral, it did not mean that loans were available to everyone. Money and credit
in all their dimensions were tightly interwoven with the processes of social
inclusion and exclusion (Bähre 2007b). The optimal group members were those
who were ‘reliable’ and ‘able to pay’, and who ‘knew enough, but not too much’,
while no group wanted somebody with a ‘poor reputation’ or ‘slowness to pay’ to
discredit their reputation. As the forming of a group was a requisite for getting a
loan, trust relations and solidarity-sharing were made an obligatory part of the
survival strategies of the poor. Stefan, one of the SEF staff members evaluated the
significance of trust relations as follows:
If they don’t know each other well, and one runs away, well, it’s their
problem. But if they know each other, they will go to her house and put
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pressure on her...We can’t give them individual loans…this is the best
way because in a group they have to support each other. And then they
are very cautious about whom to take into the group.
(Stefan, SEF staff member, 11 July  2007)
The clients thus needed to invest a considerable amount of time and energy in
finding reliable group members and in monitoring each other’s businesses. Many
women regretted that it was difficult to get sufficient information on each person’s
background. The situation was further complicated by various rumours circulating
about those who would be useful for the group and those who would only cause
problems. Contradictory images of successful versus questionable businesses
were confusing. People told horror stories of persons engaged in the clothing
business ‘who sell their items on credit and then have problems in getting their
money back’; of vegetable hawkers ‘who lose all their capital because of spoiled
stocks of tomatoes’, and of beer brewers ‘who cause all kinds of problems in the
communities by persuading men to drink too much’. On the contrary, other people
preferred the clothing business ‘because it gives you plenty of money’, the food
business ‘because people need something to eat every day’; or the beer business
‘because men always drink’.
According to SEF rules, credits were granted only for business purposes and the
money loaned had to be utilized according to a systematic business plan.
However, during the interviews many clients demonstrated a limited knowledge
of the SEF rules for microcredits. The poorest women, especially, had little
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opportunity to carefully consider whether the money loaned was invested in a
productive business or spent on daily consumption needs. The mainstream
microcredit thinking, according to which the clients would follow systematic
business strategies, is based on a narrow conceptualization of the poor’s everyday
struggles for livelihoods. As noted by Francis (2002: 544) in her study of
livelihood diversification in South Africa, we should question how appropriate it
is to conceptualize the livelihood activities of the poor in terms of ‘strategizing’,
rather than in terms of coping with poverty and unequal power relations. Under
such conditions, some have more room to manoeuvre, while others must deal with
their agency and opportunities for strategizing considerably constrained.
Although SEF clients received their loans individually, loan repayments were
hardly the concern of an individual or a single group alone. Joint liabilities
promoted different kinds of anxieties and tensions within the microcredit groups,
particularly when people were struggling with scarce resources. Drop-out rates
from groups were relative; the most common reasons for members leaving a
group were: they were tired; they had been robbed; they had trouble with loan
repayments, or their spouse was against a group loan (SEF 2008: 6). If one
member of a microcredit group proved to be insolvent, other members had to pay
on her behalf, find a new member to replace her, and only then apply for a new
loan. Sara, one of the SEF clients explained the procedure as follows:
Sara: There have been members who have left. So we need to find
members to replace them...
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Interviewer: Why did these members leave?
Sara: Most times we find that people who have left us...they took SEF
money, and their business didn’t go well. Then the only thing to do is to
renounce your membership because you aren’t able to pay.
Interviewer: Did they just leave or did you make them leave?
Sara: If it’s a serious case then...we all have to raise money to cover for
this person. If this happens repetitively, so you don’t have a choice; you
just make the client leave.
(Sara, MCP client in a rural village, 8 June 2007)
Although the women were asked to form microcredit groups on the basis of
existing trust relations, in fact, many people joined a group simply by replacing
somebody else. An urgent need for credit sometimes pressured the groups to
accept nearly anyone as a member, even persons they hardly knew. This left room
for individuals who were looking for quick earnings; who managed to infiltrate a
group and get a loan, but who then took a taxi to Johannesburg and disappeared,
leaving the others to repay. Considering the clients’ vulnerable socio-economic
situation, liabilities shared within the groups, and the fact that money matters were
not easily discussed even with close relatives, it was surprising that the women
entrusted the sharing of their business affairs and money matters to persons whom
they barely knew.
Adverse incentives often coincided with a weak group formation. It was in the
development facilitators’ interest to reach as many clients as possible. The bigger
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the number of clients and the lower the number of arrears and drop-outs, the
higher the development facilitator’s salary. There was also an annual award for
the eight best performing development facilitators at SEF. Along with these
economic rewards, it was a matter of honour and social prestige to have a high
number of clients. According to SEF management, one of their biggest concerns
was the high turnover of the development facilitators. Besides the relatively low
salary, the temptation to leave SEF was related to poor working conditions. As
one of the development facilitators put it: ‘Being on your own, far away from
your organization…and obliged to adhere to strict time schedules and
responsibilities is not an easy task.’
The centre meetings were organized every two weeks by the centre leaders – the
chair, the secretary and the treasurer – with the assistance of a development
facilitator. The attendance at the meetings was compulsory under the penalty of a
fine. The centre leaders had to find a place to meet as well as run the meetings. As
the rents for official meeting places were high, the meetings were often organized
in ‘any place decent enough’, such as under the most popular tree of the village, in
a school yard or at one of the clients’ home.
Most of the women strongly criticized such arrangements, particularly for the lack
of security. Repayments were made in cash at the meeting or each group
deposited its own share in the SEF bank account and brought the receipts to the
meeting. The amount to be paid by a centre could reach R20,000, and it was the
clients’ responsibility to deliver the money safely to the bank, which could mean
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30 kilometres of stressful travel by taxi. Vulnerability to thefts, assaults and other
crimes determined how people dealt with money matters and organized their
business affairs. Despite their demands that SEF should arrange a proper place for
business meetings and run them less often, most of the clients felt that they had no
control over the issue. Kathy, who offered her two-room house as a temporary
meeting place without any compensation, explained the matter as follows: ‘There
is little you can do, rules are rules, and otherwise there wouldn’t be any loans.’
The representatives of SEF management had no plans to change the meeting
system. According to them, the meetings offered important opportunities for
fieldworkers to help the clients and monitor the savings and repayments. Although
they understood the clients’ concern,  according to SEF management, it would
have been too costly for the organization to arrange the meetings in a more
official way. Within the prevalent scheme, the fieldworkers had a crucial role in
assuring that SEF received its money back from the clients. It was not
coincidental that these fieldworkers were called ‘Development Facilitators’. The
term reflected SEF’s vision of fieldworkers as ‘those who show the clients how to
do business’ and who ‘promote development’ among the targeted population.
Communication between SEF management and the clients happened mainly
through these development facilitators, who thus became interpreters between two
‘worlds’. They explained the SEF goals and rules to the clients, and at the same
time provided the SEF with updated, first-hand information about the clients’




According to SEF management, one of the key principles in the microcredit
scheme was to adhere to strict rules and requisites, ‘otherwise, people will start to
take advantage’. In a certain sense, SEF encouraged development facilitators to
display an authoritative, top-down position vis-à-vis the clients. Considerable
emphasis was put on the anticipation of clients’ intentions to misuse and
manipulate. SEF management perceived the work of development facilitators as
‘a game in which you have to be well prepared to react to the opposition’s next
move,  preferably  being  one  move  ahead’.  Tony,  a  staff  member  in  SEF
management gave the following advice to development facilitators to play this
‘game over cleverness’:
Don’t tell them when you are coming to check the business. Surprise
them! Because what they do, they borrow from neighbours, and suddenly
you see this big stock and tomorrow it’s not there. And then you don’t
know the real story. So surprise them! Go and check what they are doing.
Visit them when they are working and watch what they are doing.
Because if you tell them, they will be prepared.
 (Tony, SEF staff member, 11 July 2007)
The SEF’s loan application forms were documented in English even though many
of the clients had limited language skills and thus difficulties in understanding the
principles of business and credit management. The same concerned the
monitoring of one’s cash flows, as the receipts of repayments and savings were
only in English. Many clients had poor knowledge of their rights and Deleted: also
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responsibilities, which limited their opportunities to contest the rules set by SEF.
At the centre meetings, penalties were imposed in the form of fines for coming
late, for absence, for noise-making, and for general disorder. As illustrated in the
following discussion, sometimes the new rules were set fairly arbitrarily:
Development facilitator: If you don’t fill in the forms and return them as
soon as possible there will be a 30 Rands fine.
(clients start complaining)
Development facilitator (shouting): You know what these papers are. I’ll
lose my job if you don’t return these forms. If I give you forms and you
don’t fill them in, I cannot give you any money.
Client: Not all of us can read and it’s difficult to fill in these forms. It’s
not right to give us a penalty.
Development facilitator: There are two groups who didn’t pay in time at
the last meeting. If something like this happens, they have to pay a 50
Rands fine.
Client: I’ve never heard about such a rule.
(Centre meeting, 26 June 2007)
Of course it would be unfair to argue that all SEF management staff and
fieldworkers based their working methods on top-down models or that all of them
had been insensitive to the clients’ everyday needs and vulnerable positions. Most
of the development facilitators felt their work was motivating because of the
opportunity ‘to change the lives of so many people’ and ‘to see how the
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businesses flourish and the clients succeed’. Correspondingly, they were upset
when some of the clients were robbed or subject to violence − issues that formed a
considerable risk and a continuous source of anxiety for people engaged in the
microbusiness in South Africa.
Social and financial affairs as tightly intertwined
Despite the dilemmas that emerged every now and then at the centre meetings,
most of the women claimed that their microcredit group had no repayment
problems. This did not mean that the groups would not have to struggle to get the
repayments; many groups had difficulties in paying the loans; however such
problems were usually managed invisibly before the centre meetings. In the
interviews, women demonstrated ambivalent attitudes toward joint liabilities and
requisites for solidarity lending. They spoke of their microcredit group members
as ‘sisters’ and emphasized the necessity ‘to help a fellow member when she gets
in trouble’, while at the same time remarking that ‘you can’t trust anyone’, ‘you
don’t help anybody else except your own family’ and ‘you shouldn’t involve other
people in your problems’. The contrast between the glorifying speeches of
solidarity and the suspicions circulating over who benefits from which businesses
and on which grounds was a striking characteristic of the everyday politics of
microcredits.
Ambiguous and rapidly changing loyalties challenged the arguments of stable
community relationships, where people share common interests and pursue
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collective goals. Concerns over liabilities and loan repayments complicated the
women’s solidarity toward each other and influenced their willingness to
participate in collective actions. While social connections were crucial for the
establishment and maintenance of successful business operations, at the same time
social networks and solidarity relations were constrained by structural conditions
of poverty which placed the clients in competition with each other. Communities
were enmeshed in complicated relations of debts in which insolvent debt claims
were a common source of conflicts.
Characteristic of the business strategies of the micro-entrepreneurs in Limpopo, as
elsewhere in the global South, was also the blurred distinction between business
and domestic affairs. Many clients depended on relatives for help in the business,
and friends and acquaintances provided important links to information and
commercial privileges. According to the existing social rules, however, i t was
expected that such favours be repaid by the reciprocal fulfilment of the demands
of needy relatives and friends. As noted by Guérin (2006) in her study of
microfinance in Senegal, and Nygren and Myatt-Hirvonen (2009) in Honduras,
under such conditions, people usually avoid savings in cash because having cash
on hand makes a person vulnerable to different kinds of demands by relatives and
friends in need. In a certain sense, the eagerness in Limpopo to apply for a
microcredit for whatever kind of purpose could partly be explained by the fact
that the official commitment to pay a credit served as a socially acceptable excuse
to refuse the financial requests of close relatives.
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The SEF clients rarely mentioned their social responsibilities and domestic duties
to the representatives of SEF: They did not want SEF to interfere with their
personal  affairs,  nor  did  they  believe  SEF  would  be  willing  to  do  so. Social
responsibilities were thus concealed from the SEF staff as if they could have been
separated from business affairs. The clients’ enrolments in microcredit
programmes were largely dependent on the ways in which rights and
responsibilities were distributed within the clients’ households. Being able to join
a microcredit group was not self-evident for most of the women. In some cases,
women were only nominal clients, while men actually controlled the money
granted by microcredit programmes; similar situations have been described in
much of the gender-informed literature on microfinance (Molynex 2002, Rankin
2002, Silvey and Elmhirst 2003). Dropping out of microcredit groups because of a
spouse’s opposition was also common; because of many people’s bad experiences
with loan sharks, the main concern for many men was the fear that their wives
would plunge into a cycle of debt. According to many women, their husbands first
strongly opposed microcredit; however, the desire for a better life made the
application for a loan attractive. In remote places, especially, where many men
were unemployed or miserably paid, women’s extra income was essential for the
family’s survival.
In fact, many women emphasized their role as active decision-makers and
considered that their abilities to defend their rights and to struggle against
inequalities had improved along with their business engagements. ‘I’m making
money, so he’ll come back’, stated Jane, whose husband had abandoned her some
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weeks earlier. In urban areas, women had also found ways to organize themselves.
Limpopo has a long history of women’s societies, such as credit and savings clubs
and religious associations, and in recent years, political movements such as the
ANC Women’s League have gained increasing influence. These movements  play
an important role in empowering marginalized women and encouraging them to
question the unequal distribution of resources and hierarchical positions of power.
Beth, one of the SEF clients, explained the situation to an interviewer:
Beth: At present there is one group member who has problems. She has a
reproachful husband. So, after every meeting, she bought a stock of
goods with the money she took from SEF. And he threw them away,
which is quite bad, you know. But we came together as a group and
we’re trying to solve this problem.
Interviewer: What can you do about this problem?
Beth: Well, we went to the house and made an appointment to see this
guy. He didn’t want to meet us that day, he didn’t want to talk to us. And
we’ve been going there time and time again, and…he isn’t anywhere to
be found. So…we went to the police station and reported the case, as
domestic abuse, and we also went to the ANC Women’s League...
Interviewer:  So, what exactly are you going to do?
Beth: Well...we’re not going to use any force or anything, we’re just
going to sit him down and tell him how it is. Usually in situations like
this they apologize…
Interviewer: Does SEF know about these things at all?
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Beth: This is how SEF operates: SEF isn’t involved in our personal lives.
So we solve our problems...If there is a person who has a problem, we
assist them. It’s not SEF’s business.
(Beth, MCP client in a semi-urban setting, 18 June 2007)
Under the financial pressures, many women were obliged to prioritize the short-
term requirements of daily survival over the longer-term demands of business
management. Characteristic of the business strategies of poor women was also a
complex dialectic between the personal aspirations of livelihood improvement and
the collective norms of cooperation. In addition to domestic needs, people were
fulfilling a myriad of communal duties and social rules of reciprocity, assisting at
funerals and weddings and taking care of the grandchildren and disabled relatives.
A considerable number of women were providing for their families alone, trying
to survive by selling coca cola or donuts (‘fat cooks’) with a loan of R500-R800.
Many had no savings or assets to protect themselves against unexpected failures,
during which time they had to rely on the charity of relatives. Credit and the
meagre economic returns were used for stock supplements and for basic
consumption, and rapidly dwindled away, and balancing between the multifaceted
needs required considerable compromises. Besides the financial problems,
concerns over business monitoring, group liabilities, and requisites for attending
the centre meetings were continuously present.
In practice, SEF’s TCP and MCP programmes did not differ markedly from each
other. Business activities in both programmes concentrated on fruit, juice, beer,
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tobacco, textile and vegetable hawking, thus on sectors with a low level of
profitability and with tendencies of oversaturation. The biggest worries of the
clients who participated in these programmes were irregular incomes, narrow
profit margins, deceitful clients, stiff competition, and difficulties with loan
repayments. The clients’ abilities to benefit from microcredits were largely
dependent on the conditions under which the credits were offered. Wealthier
clients usually got bigger loans right from the beginning, and many of them were
engaged in the textile and sewing businesses, where it was possible to increase
loan sizes more quickly than in the grocery business. The size of dressmakers’
loans ranged from R1,000 to R5,000, while sellers of fruit and soft drinks had to
be content with a maximum loan of R1,000. Better-off clients were also more
capable of protecting themselves against financial shocks through savings and
assets, and more likely to be able to diversify their businesses based on improved
business skills, increased working capital and bigger stocks. The most vulnerable
clients often had deficiencies, even in basic business skills; many of them started a
tiny business of selling small items at home, without a clear plan on how to run
the business. Many of these clients had limited possibilities of separating their
incomes from the debt claims and most of them had difficulties in guaranteeing
their futures stocks. If they ran out of items in stock, the only opportunity was to
wait for the next loan cycle.
As SEF’s operations had grown, the competition between the clients had become
fiercer. Some clients remarked that ‘it was easier to sustain a business ten years
ago; now, if you invent a new way of doing business, suddenly there are ten
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others doing the same’. Yet a village cannot sustain 500 tomato hawkers. Another
threat to SEF clients were the Indian and Chinese shops, which were spreading
everywhere, even to the most remote villages, and which easily undercut the
prices.
Social norms and cultural conventions also strongly mediated people’s business
strategies. Prices were often settled together and nobody was allowed to raise the
price without permission from the others. Sometimes prices were so low that they
hardly covered the expenses. Even the business strategies, selling areas, and time-
schedules were often settled together. If two neighbours were running a beer
house next to each other, they might even settle on the days when each could run
their business in order to avoid direct competition. Within a microcredit group,
one member could sell underwear, the other blankets, buying these items from
each other at a certain price, and thus circulating money among the group.
According to SEF’s rules, the clients were encouraged to save a small amount of
money on a two-week basis as part of the membership criteria. Before the
disbursement of the first loan, the groups had to open a group savings account and
demonstrate their ability to save. These savings along with the repayment
performance affected the group ranking in creditworthiness within the next loan
cycle. Although the savings were personal, they were deposited in a group
account, and the agreement of all group members was required to withdraw the
savings. This procedure was based on the paternalistic attitude of ‘preventing
people from wasting the money for nothing’. Despite SEF pressure on the clients
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to save, relatively few clients were able to contribute to the savings account, and
the average size of deposits was low.
One reason for the low rate of savings might be that in addition to SEF savings,
many women had established special saving societies to support those who had
problems with loan repayments. Some women also had difficulties in adjusting
their business duties to their social responsibilities. If there was a funeral at home,
it was considered inappropriate to operate a business and attend the centre
meetings for a period of four to six months. During this time the other group
members took care of the loan repayment or they sought a person to temporally
replace this member. ‘She’s got problems; once they’re over she’ll give us our
money back’, these group members explained in the interviews. Correspondingly,
if a wedding was to be arranged, women helped in the preparations and were thus
unable to run their businesses. If a child became seriously ill, the mother usually
had to ignore her business activities.
Financial affairs were also tightly interwoven with the households’ livelihood
portfolios based on sporadic streams of formal and informal, regular and irregular
incomes. Hectic forms of decision-making and intermittent business operations
were partly a response to the overall economic instability and political volatility in
which people were forced to struggle to earn their living through an array of
activities and business ventures. Along with the microcredit programmes, various
kinds of informal self-help groups existed. Nearly everybody belonged to a burial
society; some were also members of funeral societies. Savings and credit
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associations (stokvels) were used to save for a special purpose, such as Christmas
expenditures, dishes, or chickens. Credit came from one-to-one borrowing, from
tax shops or from loan sharks. Different saving schemes had different purposes:
one might be for food expenses, while another was for school fees.
Still, economic activities were irregular and incomes were small, and in this
heterogeneity of economic activities, the role of microcredits and micro-
businesses in isolation from the people’s overall struggles for livelihoods is
difficult to understand. Irregularity of incomes obliged some clients to use credit
associations to cover the repayments to SEF. Sometimes they joined other
microcredit programmes, such as the SEF’s major competitor, Marang, to pay the
loans derived from SEF. Some clients were successful in this kind of merry-go-
round, while many others ended up in a circle of debt having to apply for a new
loan to pay off an earlier one.
While in social capital -oriented literature close social ties have been assumed to
rely on horizontal norms that generate trust, the microcredit operations in
Limpopo were based on more or less hierarchical relations. Solidarity did not
always materialize as intended, and various kinds of tensions emerged between
the clients sharing the liabilities. While some of the clients barely profited from
their business activities, others made considerable progress, sometimes at the
expense of others. Even if repayment meetings were promoted because of their
empowering effect, in a certain sense such arrangements only strengthened the
existing power relations by giving increasing authority to the centre leaders, who
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were already in a better position than the ordinary clients. It was not unusual that
the chair of the centre meeting humiliated those members who could not pay or
who came late to the meeting by publicly reprimanding them. Better-off clients
were also eager to show their status on various occasions. While the poorest
clients stocked up in nearby villages or towns, the wealthier hired a taxi to
Johannesburg or Durban to buy their items there; some stayed overnight at a hotel
and then related exciting stories to the others about their trips. While the poorest
clients tried to avoid all types of debts, the better-off clients sometimes assumed a
debt deliberately and then used the funds for informal money lending.
One such person was Rose, who supported herself by selling blankets, sheets and
women’s underwear. If a member of her microcredit group was unable to pay her
share of the repayment, Rose helped her but always considered the help as a loan,
which the borrower had to pay back with interest. In a certain sense, she was
acting as a loan shark within the group. Every now and then Rose threatened to
leave the group, but each time the other members begged her to stay. Poor clients
were desperately dependent on the wealthier ones, who often took advantage of
the situation, thereby increasing their power. At the same time, many of the most
vulnerable clients were excluded from advantageous business circles because of
their poverty and disadvantaged social status. These distinctions were implicitly
reinforced by the SEF’s ranking system, which evaluated the most successful
clients as the most prestigious ones, not only because of their ability to help
poorer fellow members and thus ensure high repayment rates. These clients also
served as convincing examples of success for other potential clients, thus acting as
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valuable ‘business cards’ of the microcredit organization.
Agendas for financial sustainability and poverty alleviation
Similar to most of the microcredit organizations, SEF focused its programmes on
poor females because women were considered to represent a more disadvantaged
section of the population, with a lower income generating capacity and less access
to education, formal sector employment, and social security benefits (Hossain and
Rahman 2001). In South Africa, there is a saying: ‘If you empower a man, you
empower a human being. But if you empower a woman, you empower a nation.’
An important reason for microcredit organizations focusing on women was also
that women were considered to be more responsible in terms of productive
investments and loan repayments and they usually shared their incomes with other
household members, thus distributing the benefits of the microcredit more widely
within the family.
Because of its highly unequal socio-economic structures, South Africa is
considered a particularly demanding environment for microcredit organizations to
attain financial sustainability. While SEF aimed to fulfil its double mission of
both improving the living standards of the poorest of the poor and attaining
financial self-sustainability, opinions regarding how to reach these two separate
targets differed considerably among the SEF staff. Even if they were committed to
the target of poverty alleviation, the staff members in SEF’s management,
administration, and financial departments preferred a more financially-oriented
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way of operation of the microcredit schemes than the field staff. In any case, SEF
was in many ways ‘sandwiched’ between its somewhat contradictory goals. At the
same time as the organization had to explain its operations for the financial board,
it struggled to conduct its original mission of creating feasible micro-enterprises
operated by the poor. While SEF had chosen to remain an NGO to maintain its
poverty-focused mission, it was under heavy financial pressure from the financial
department, the board, and the donors.
As SEF’s operations had grown, direct communication between the organization
and its clients had diminished. At the start of its operations in the early 1990s,
with two officers in a rural village, the interaction with clients was much more
direct.  SEF’s  outreach  had  grown  on  average  23  per  cent  a  year,  from  22,110
clients in 2004 to 50,319 clients in 2008 (SEF Soc 2009). Some of the staff
members in SEF’s head office had never visited the targeted African settlements.
Tony from the SEF’s head office explained her experiences as follows:
Unfortunately...we don’t have the relationship we used to. Now, we only
know people by name, by number, by application number, which is
rather sad. But I suppose the intention is the same. We help them to uplift
their families…you should see the houses they have built, they were
living in little shacks; really very, very poor. And business has
expanded...you really see the improvement. I don’t know much now,
because I don’t go out much. But I’m sure it’s still helping...It’s just that
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we’ve grown too big for us to be able to see. But maybe our development
facilitators see the fruits.
(Tony, SEF staff member, 11 July 2007)
The development facilitators strongly challenged the SEF’s target for enlarged
operations by arguing that assistance of a huge number of clients constrains the
goals of poverty alleviation if more employees are not hired. In fact, many of the
development facilitators’ tasks had been recently transferred to the group leaders.
As noted by Jim, one of the SEF’s workers, the risk in such operations was that
the clients would be left to rely on their own resources:
You need more time with the clients, you need staff that would spend
more time with the clients...It’s expensive but you need that…The other
[problem] is that the group and centre structures are not functioning, they
are not functioning, they are just a collecting machine. Once the loan is
there, they just collect, there’s no support for each other.
(Jim, SEF staff member, 9 July 2007)
SEF clients felt that they did not have sufficient business skills and that they
would have needed more assistance and training, especially in business
management. Often training was given only to group leaders whose responsibility
it became to train the other group members. The idea of centre meetings as forums
for training was, in fact, somewhat questionable. Because of transportation
problems, development facilitators had difficulties in arriving at meetings in time,
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and often the training component was set aside for monitoring repayments and
recording savings. SEF staff acknowledged the problems; however, because of
financial pressures they were reluctant to change the procedures. In rural areas,
especially, the clients’ needs for assistance were enormous. Paradoxically, in such
circumstances SEF decided to transfer many of the training responsibilities from
the organization to the clients.
This tactic responded better to the lenders’ concerns over the organization’s
financial sustainability than to the clients’ hopes for assistance and empowerment.
At the same time, this strategy made the microcredit groups and their relations of
solidarity instruments for diminishing the costs of screening and monitoring. This
tactic was promoted in the name of ‘supporting the entrepreneurship of the
disadvantaged’, where the poor who were previously considered as passive
receivers of aid were now seen as creative agents of their own development. The
problem was that through such arrangements, the responsibilities, while not
necessarily the rights, of the women were considerably increased. Clients were
forced to shoulder additional transaction costs without any economic
compensation. These included time and effort spent on finding group members,
costs of monitoring the repayments and delivering the money to the bank,
obligations to cover up if a group member was robbed, and duties to teach
business skills to new clients.
For SEF management, the group lending model with joint liabilities and peer-
monitoring mechanisms was ‘the only secure way to carry out the business of
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microcredits’. In the case of conflicts it was the responsibility of the clients and
the fieldworkers to manage the situation. At the same time SEF defended its strict
rules for negotiations: ‘Clients know the rules. If they don’t follow them, it’s their
problem, no compromise.’ Justifications for SEF not to intervene in conflict
situations were based on essentialist views of African women and their communal
way of life: ‘They have their own laws, they’ll solve them anyway’, explained one
of SEF staff member.
Surely clear rules were needed to prevent opportunities for misuse and
manipulations. However, such rules should not reinforce existing power relations.
In the interviews, some of the SEF staff presented fairly categorical images  of
their clients: ‘disadvantaged but inventive people’, ‘lacking business skills
although naturally business-oriented’. While microcredit programmes were
tailored with the aim of strengthening the financial capabilities of the poor and
empowering them with increased bargaining power, in practice, the poor were
often seen as responsible for their own predicament. There was little consideration
of the wider political-economic structures that constrained the opportunities of the
poor to advance their business operations and that limited their chances to
eliminate poverty and social marginalization.
Conclusion
This article has analysed microcredit as a socio-political institution and a form of
everyday politics and power, by drawing on a case study of microcredit operations
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in Limpopo, South Africa. Special attention has been paid to the complicated rules
and responsibilities affecting the relations between the microcredit organization as
a loan provider and the female poor as loan receivers, as well as to the ambiguous
networks, norms, and forms of decision-making among the women themselves as
microcredit groups and participants in small business ventures.
In much of the mainstream development thinking, microfinance has been
promoted as a ‘magic bullet’ for economic development and poverty alleviation in
Southern rural and peri-urban settlements with high rates of chronic poverty,
unemployment and lack of working capital. Microcredit models, which provide
loans for small groups of mainly female low-income clients, who then invest the
money in micro-enterprises and share joint liability over for repayments, have
been encouraged as innovative mechanisms to prevent the poor’s need for
collateral and to decrease their dependence on precarious systems of informal
money-lending. The essential idea in such group-based lending models is that the
‘community-based’ microcredit groups rely on reciprocal trust relations and ties
of solidarity sharing, which promote high loan repayment rates and fair forms of
participatory development.
As has been shown in our analysis, social capital -oriented arguments for
microcredits as innovative forms of poverty alleviation and participatory
emancipation tend to be based on simplistic notions of harmonic community
relations and horizontal norms of solidarity (Bähre 2007a).  Our  analysis  of
microcredit as an arena of negotiations and tradeoffs in Limpopo revealed a much
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more complicated picture of how the distribution of rights and responsibilities
between the microcredit organization and microcredit groups, together with the
multifaceted struggles over authority and power, mediated the different actors’
social agency and opportunities to benefit from the microcredit programmes.
Correspondingly, the social relations between the members of the microcredit
groups were based on ambiguous forms of cooperation and conflict around
diverse interests and multifaceted social relations. Concerns over loan repayments
and liabilities, requisites to monitor each other’s business activities, and duties to
attend microcredit meetings promoted different kinds of tensions among the
women engaged in microcredit programmes, thus complicating the women’s
solidarity toward each other. While social networks were crucial for the
establishment and maintenance of business operations, structural conditions of
poverty and marginalization placed the women in competition with each other
over limited resources and easily saturated markets.
Our study has also challenged the expectations of microfinance providers on
microfinance management, which tend to be based on the assumption that
impoverished women operating largely in informal sector markets would follow
systematic business plans in their business activities. It can be questioned how
appropriate it is to conceptualize the business activities of the poor in South
Africa, or elsewhere in the global South, in terms of strategizing rather than
coping with poverty and struggling against inequalities (Francis 2002). In the
logic of decision-making among the poor households in Limpopo, economic
affairs were tightly enmeshed with social rules, cultural norms and political power




relations. The distinction between the financial and social components in the
women’s lives proved to be artificial in a situation where economic activities,
social relations and cultural conventions were intrinsically interwoven in people’s
efforts to earn their living from fragile business ventures and shifting social
alliances. Continuous tradeoffs and compromises were necessary between present
consumption needs and the long-term requirements of business management.
Characteristic of the business strategies of the women in Limpopo was also a
complex dialectic between the personal aspirations of livelihood improvement and
the collective norms of cooperation and social reciprocity.
Development agendas based on romanticized views of social capital as a ‘notable
asset of the poor’ and on visions in which the responsibilities of pro-poor
development are being increasingly shifted from governmental institutions to
market-based mechanisms, or to the poor themselves, contain the risk of a
‘privatization of the economic crisis’ (González de la Rocha 2007, Kay 2006). We
need to be more aware of the overall problems of economic insecurity and
political volatility characteristic of South Africa as well as many other parts in the
global South, which, together with the unequal access to resources, constrain the
ability of the poor to advance their business operations and to create pathways out
of poverty. As remarked by Bebbington (2007), social capital cannot substitute for
policies designed to achieve integrated forms of economic and social development
through redistributive measures and sound economic policies. In the case of
microcredit programmes, more attention should be given to the political-economic
structures that constrain the opportunities of the poor to advance their business
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operations and that limit their chances to eliminate poverty even when capacities
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